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Abstract  
The Structure of Scientific Revolution (1962) by Thomas 
Kuhn challenged the traditional understanding of science 
and philosophy of science. Central to his notion of 
incommensurability are the ideas of meaning variance 
and lexicon, and the impossibility of the translation of 
terms across different theories. It is closely related to the 
linguistic analysis of scientific language. This paper 
analyses the notion of scientific language in the context of 
incommensurability with a special reference to the theory 
of meaning. This paper shows how Kuhn’s theory of 
incommensurability can be applied to linguistics to 
overcome the problems that arise due to similar lexical 
terms and argues that Kuhn’s epistemological analysis of 
incommensurability, particularly the challenge of 
understanding the process of symbolization in scientific 
theories, when applied to linguistics, can revolutionize 
the discipline itself which fills the existing knowledge 
gap.  
Keywords: paradigm shift, incommensurability, theory of 
meaning, ontological commitment 
1.Introduction 
Kuhn was a dominant figure in the twentieth-century philosophy 
of science. His thoughts altered the terms of philosophical debate 
and challenged traditional conceptions of philosophy and 
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philosophy of science. Without Kuhn it is possible to make sense of 
linguistics, but I have filled a gap by showing that the discipline 
which focuses mostly on the idea of ‘Language’ can use his 
philosophy to explain its own institutional dilemmas. 
Incommensurable ideas correlate with incommensurable 
vocabularies, and different paradigms speak different languages. 
The irony is that linguists, who are so adept at analysing the 
languages of others, have missed an interesting aspect of their own 
languages, and the subsequent communication difficulties which 
these have engendered. 
1.1 Incommensurability and Language  
Literally, incommensurability means the impossibility or 
unavailability of a common system of measure. The concept of 
incommensurability, presented by Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend 
(though differently), suggested that the meaning of theoretical 
terms differed in various applications or iterations of scientific 
theories, thereby rendering the evaluation or comparison of these 
‘incommensurable’ theories problematic. The causal theory of 
meaning was applied to natural kinds within the philosophy of 
language as one of several ways to address the problem of meaning 
or, in related yet somewhat specialized variations, the problem of 
referent determination and the problem of meaning change.  
The doctrine of incommensurability(#), as a consequence assumes 
that each theory determines a unique scientific language. It is 
useful to begin with a brief discussion of the logical empiricist 
tradition and the historicist relation to it, and to see how the denial 
that theories rest on a neutral observation base motivates the thesis 
that meaning is theory-laden. What the proponents of the logical 
empiricist tradition have maintained amounts to this. Scientific 
theories are parasitic on an independent, pre-theoretical, 
observation language. The justification of the statements belonging 
to the observation language is carried out in complete 
independence from the theoretical considerations. Moreover, they 
are justified by a direct semantic relation to the situations that they 
describe. However, theoretical claims lack such a relation because 
their connection with reality is mediated by the observation 
sentences which serve as their Justification. Given that 
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interpretation, one must find the primary place of both meaning 
and truth in the observation language alone. For it is only in the 
observation of language, that the link between language and reality 
is secured. 
We find in Kuhn a strong argument in favour of such an 
assimilation. Scientific concepts are always learned in a context 
which includes, applicational procedures, inferential moves and 
problem-solving techniques; and that context is strictly delimited 
by theory. For Kuhn, 
Verbal definitions like Boyle’s have little scientific 
content when considered by themselves. They are not 
full logical specifications of meaning (if there are such), 
but more nearly pedagogic aids. The scientific concepts 
to which they point gain full significance only when 
related, within a text or other systematic presentation, 
to other scientific concepts, to manipulative procedures, 
and to paradigm applications. It follows that concepts 
like that of an element can scarcely be invented 
independent of context. Furthermore, given the context, 
they rarely require invention because they are already 
at hand (Kuhn, 1970, p. 141). 
Therefore, meaning is fully determined intra-theoretically. Hence, 
the language of a theory is unhindered by the extra-theoretical 
residue that comes under the purview of the theory. Following this 
view, a theory’s inferential structure cannot be identified with the 
transformation rules of the syntax of its language. Hence, 
alternatives to that theory will be strictly incoherent. The language 
of a theory is so structured that, when we use it, it is impossible to 
say anything irrelevant to or incompatible with the theory’s 
ontological commitment($). 
The philosophy of language that underlies the doctrine of 
incommensurability of competing theories apparently results from 
mistaking Wittgenstein's maxim that “the meaning is the use.” It 
explains that the meaning of a theoretical expression is to be 
determined by the exhaustive specification of its syntactic and 
semantic roles. However, these roles cannot be determined 
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extensionally by the natural linguistic behaviour of the sign 
representing a theoretical concept; the sign has different meanings 
in the context of different theories which would be obscured if its 
role were so specified in a language capable of encompassing 
alternative theories. As meaning is believed to be theory-specific, 
what constitutes a single-use is determined by the theory in whose 
expression a term occurs. For, that theory determines the formation 
of rules, inferential connections and criteria of application of the 
language to which the term belongs. 
Thus, the logistical structure of a theory is identified with the 
syntax of the only language in which the theory is properly 
expressed. That makes both the theory and its associated language 
static. If any change is brought about in a theory, it transforms the 
language appropriate to its expression. It then renders the new 
version literally incommensurable with its predecessor. It follows 
that there is no language available for the description of theory 
growth and development. Consequently, it is imposable to identify 
a series of articulations (Kuhn upholds theory of 
incommensurability articulation) as versions of the same theory. 
Changes in background knowledge affect the identity of theory as 
well. If the statements of background knowledge are to enter into 
theoretical deductions, they must belong to the same language as 
the theoretical premises with which they are conjoined. Thus if the 
structure or content of these statements are altered, then they 
constitute modifications of the theory's language as well. Since the 
form of that language is determined by the theory, it is impossible 
to modify the language without changing the theory. It follows, on 
this account that change in theory, can be brought about by 
changes in belief, remote from the axioms and theorems belonging 
to the logistical system of the theory proper. It also follows that it is 
impossible to identify distinct logistical systems as alternative 
formalizations of a single theory. Subsequently, a theory is 
identified by reference to its formalism and the theories embedded 
in different formalisms are ipso facto distinct. 
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2. Incommensurability and the Theory of Meaning 
The problem of meaning change presented a challenge in the 
determination of a referent either at different points in time or for 
(different) generalizations that shared the same referent. The 
problem of incommensurability, presented both by Kuhn and by 
Paul Feyerabend in slightly different forms, suggested that the 
meaning of theoretical terms differed in various applications or 
iterations of scientific theories, thereby rendering the evaluation or 
comparison of these “incommensurable” theories problematic. Yet 
the conclusions drawn by Kuhn and Feyerabend – that the 
evaluation or comparison of incommensurable generalizations 
must be conducted on the basis of something other than logical or 
linguistic analysis – seemed to challenge the very foundations of 
established views of rationality. For scholars who were loath to 
give up this established position, incommensurability needed to be 
explained and the problem of meaning change that it presented 
needed to be addressed. Feyerabend proposed that their concerns 
might be addressed through reliance on aesthetic judgments and 
evaluation of the form (but not the content) of scientific theories. 
Kuhn sought to defend his views against the charges of 
irrationality lodged by Feyerabend and other philosophers of 
science by proposing that the problem of meaning change 
highlighted the operation of “good reasons” for theory choice, even 
in the cases of incommensurability. Yet as we will see, the 
differences between exemplars of the “good reasons” identified by 
Kuhn and the aesthetic judgments of Feyerabend were not as 
substantive as either of the two scholars suggested. 
Although Kuhn’s conception of incommensurability changed 
throughout the course of his research, it remained at the center of 
the issues that he investigated. In Structure, incommensurability 
was used to characterize the non-cumulative break between 
successive scientific traditions and was described as a gestalt 
switch or change in scientists’ “ways of seeing” the world. 
Following the publication of Structure, Kuhn refined the 
conception, linking it to issues and investigations in the philosophy 
of language: 
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When writing the book on revolutions, I described 
them as episodes in which the meanings of certain 
scientific terms changed, and I suggested that the result 
was an incommensurability of viewpoints and a partial 
breakdown of communication between the proponents 
of different theories. I have since recognized that 
“meaning change” recognizes a problem rather than an 
isolable phenomenon, and I am now persuaded, largely 
by the work of Quine, that the problems of 
incommensurability and partial communication should 
be treated in another way. Proponents of different 
theories (or different paradigms, in the broader sense of 
the term), speak different languages – languages 
expressing different cognitive commitments, suitable 
for different worlds. Their abilities to grasp each other’s 
viewpoints are therefore inevitably limited by the 
imperfections of the processes of translation and of 
reference determination. Those issues are currently the 
ones that concern me most, and I hope before long to 
have more to say about them. (     Kuhn, 1977, xxii – i) 
In these initial refinements of the notion of incommensurability, 
Kuhn thus began to characterize it in terms of the problem of 
meaning. In particular, he characterized it as a problem of partial 
communication that could be explained by recourse to the 
philosophical processes involved in translation and reference 
determination. 
In considering Kuhn’s extension of his investigations to issues and 
approaches in the philosophy of language, it is important to note 
his interest not only in language itself but also in the language-
nature link and its relation to exemplars: 
. . . in learning [a specialized] language, as they must to 
participate in their community’s work, new members 
acquire a set of cognitive commitments that are not, in 
principle, fully analyzable within that language itself. 
Such commitments are a consequence of the ways in 
which the terms, phrases, and sentences of the language 
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are applied to nature, and it is its relevance to the 
language nature link that makes the original narrower 
sense of “paradigm” [i.e., construct paradigm or 
exemplary problem solution] so important (Kuhn, 1977, 
xxii). 
To the extent, then, that Kuhn sought to examine the problem of 
incommensurability within the context of philosophy of language 
and the problem of meaning, he was interested not simply in 
changes of language but, more precisely, in changes of the 
language-nature link. (^)Such changes were, he proposed, 
integrally linked with the knowledge gained from exemplars. 
3. The “Double-Faced Character” of Scientific Language 
In “What Are Scientific Revolutions?” (1987/2000), Kuhn proposed 
that “the central character of scientific revolutions is that they alter 
the knowledge of nature that is intrinsic to the language itself and 
thus prior to anything quite describable as description or 
generalization, scientific or everyday” (Kuhn, 1987/2000, p. 32). 
Following a detailed study of the revolutions prompted by Newton 
(mechanics), Volta (electronic battery) and Planck (quantum 
theory), he offered a refined conception of meaning change, first as 
a change in the way that referents are determined and then, more 
specifically, as a change in “several of the taxonomic categories 
prerequisite to scientific descriptions and generalizations” (Kuhn, 
1987/2000, p. 30). Noting that his views were still developing, he 
proposed that, 
…roughly speaking, the distinctive character of 
revolutionary change in language is that it alters not 
only the criteria by which terms attach to nature but 
also, massively, the set of objects or situations to which 
those terms attach. What had been paradigmatic 
examples of motion for Aristotle – acorn to oak or 
sickness to health – were not motions at all for Newton. 
In the transition, a natural family ceased to be natural; 
its members were redistributed among preexisting sets; 
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and only one of them continued to bear the old name.  
(Kuhn, 1987/2000, p . 29-30) 
Revolutionary change in language thus involves not only a change 
in criteria but also a change in the underlying taxonomic structure 
by which a particular “natural family” is determined. As such, the 
changes that occur thus are not simply linguistic or logical but, 
more fundamentally, taxonomic. In this respect, “language” itself is 
not “simply” linguistic or logical but is linked with a particular 
taxonomy in some (as yet undetermined) way. 
Emphasizing that the redistribution of objects and situations 
among taxonomic categories is a redistribution among multiple, 
inter-defined categories, he concluded that “this sort of alteration is 
necessarily holistic” (Kuhn, 1987/2000, p. 30). Furthermore, he 
proposed that the holistic nature of the change is, 
. . . rooted in the nature of language, for the criteria 
relevant to categorization are ipso facto the criteria that 
attach the names of those categories to the world. 
Language is a coinage with two faces, one looking 
outward to the world, the other inward to the world’s 
reflection in the referential structure of the language. (     
Kuhn, 1987/2000, p. 30) 
In making this assertion, Kuhn posited language as establishing a 
connection between the determination of a referent and a particular 
referential structure. 
Examining this connection from the opposing perspective – how to 
determine a referential structure (as opposed to a particular 
referent) – Kuhn noted that the changes of meaning that occur with 
scientific revolutions are typically accompanied by changes of 
model, metaphor or analogy. Furthermore, he suggested that these 
“metaphor-like juxtapositions” are “central to the process by which 
scientific and other language is acquired:” 
When the exhibit of examples is part of the process of 
learning terms like “motion,” “cell,” or “energy 
element,” what is acquired is knowledge of language 
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and of the world together. On the one hand, the student 
learns what these terms mean, what features are 
relevant for attaching them to nature, what things 
cannot be said of them on pain of self-contradiction, 
and so on. On the other hand, the student learns what 
categories of things populate the world, what their 
salient features are, and something about the behavior 
that is and is not permitted of them. In much of 
language learning these two sorts of knowledge – 
knowledge of words and knowledge of nature – are 
acquired together, not really two sorts of knowledge at 
all, but two faces of the single coinage that a language 
provides. (Kuhn, 1987/2000, p. 31) 
Once again, we encounter the “double-faced character” of scientific 
language, this time from the perspective of language learning and 
implicitly, the development of a referential structure. 
Kuhn proposed that this reappearance provided “an appropriate 
terminus” for his paper, providing no further elaboration of either 
the distinctive character of “scientific language” or the basis on 
which its “double face” may be established (or changed). Given the 
subject of scientific revolutions, Kuhn’s neglect of a detailed 
investigation of the dual-nature of scientific language and the basis 
for establishing (or changing) its dual aspects may have been 
appropriate; however, it was unfortunate from the perspective of 
the development of his broader theory. Focusing solely on the 
changes that occurred with revolutions, he stated simply, 
If I am right, the central characteristic of scientific 
revolutions is that they alter the knowledge of nature 
that is intrinsic to the language itself and that is thus 
prior to anything quite describable as generalization, 
scientific or every day. (Kuhn, 1987/2000, p. 31-2) 
As we will see, the double-faced character of scientific language 
served as an important focal point for Kuhn’s subsequent 
investigations. It provided a basis from which he extended 
established approaches to the problem of meaning change (i.e., 
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changes in the criteria used for reference determination) to consider 
the problem of incommensurability (i.e., changes in the underlying 
referential structure). 
4. Incommensurability and the Idea of a Conceptual Scheme 
In characterizing his views on incommensurability as concerned 
with words and with lexical taxonomy, Kuhn noted that a more 
refined characterization would extend to concepts, rather than 
words: (Kuhn 1991) 
What I have been calling a lexical taxonomy might, that 
is, better be called a conceptual scheme, where the 
“very notion” of a conceptual scheme is not that of a set 
of beliefs but of a particular operating mode of a mental 
module prerequisite to having beliefs, a mode that at 
once supplies and bounds the set of beliefs it is possible 
to conceive. Some such taxonomic module I take to be 
prelinguistic and possessed by animals. Presumably it 
evolved originally for the sensory, most obviously for 
the visual, system. In the book I shall give reasons for 
supposing that it developed from a still more 
fundamental mechanism which enables individual 
living organisms to reidentify other substances by 
tracing their spatio-temporal trajectories. (Kuhn, 
1991/2000, p. 94) 
In this reference to Donald Davidson’s essay, “The Very Idea of a 
Conceptual Scheme” (1974), Kuhn rejected Davidson’s 
characterization of his position as relying upon a set of beliefs, and 
proposed instead “ a particular operating mode of a mental module 
prerequisite to having beliefs.” While Kuhn’s response can hardly 
be considered to be a clarification of his position, it merits further 
consideration given the widespread influence of the views 
articulated in Davidson’s paper; Kuhn’s insistent rejection of 
Davidson’s attempts to undercut incommensurability; and the clear 
importance of the proposal to Kuhn’s (developing) position. 
Kuhn introduced the statements above by proposing that the 
“lexical taxonomy” might more appropriately be called a 
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conceptual scheme. In this respect, we recall his clarification in 
“Possible Worlds” that his interest in the lexicon, terms and 
statements reflected a concern with “conceptual or intentional 
categories more generally, e.g., with those which may be 
reasonably attributed to animals or to the perceptual system” 
(Kuhn, 1986/2000). This position was clarified further through 
Kuhn’s later response to Hacking and the expansion of his 
considerations from natural kinds to “kinds and kind terms in 
general” (Kuhn 1990/2000, p. 229). Later in that essay, Kuhn 
summarized his position regarding the role of kind terms in the 
lexicon: 
Kind terms supply the categories prerequisite to 
description of and generalization about the world. If 
two communities differ in their conceptual 
vocabularies, their members will describe the world 
differently and make different generalizations about it. 
Sometimes such differences can be resolved by 
importing the concepts of one into the conceptual 
vocabulary of the other. But if the terms to be imported 
are kind terms that overlap kind terms already in place, 
no importation is possible, at least no importation 
which allows both terms to retain their meaning, their 
projectibility, their status as kind terms. Some of the 
kinds that populate the worlds of the two communities 
are then irreconcilably different, and the difference is 
no longer between descriptions but between the 
populations described. (Kuhn, 1990-2000, p. 233) 
This passage is particularly important because it presents Kuhn’s 
argument against Davidson’s proposal that incommensurability 
can be addressed by the addition of terms: if the imported (kind) 
terms overlap kind terms that are already in place, that importation 
will draw into question the status of both sets of terms as kind 
terms. 
On this account, it is central to the processes involved in a 
community’s description of and generalization about the world 
that the terms (of the lexicon, lexical taxonomy, or conceptual 
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scheme) whereby the world is described or characterized are kind 
terms. These are not simply sets of beliefs. Nor are they simply 
markers or labels attached to a collection of individuals by an 
original, historical act of dubbing. They are the kind terms of the 
community. Collectively, they form the basis for communication 
among the members of the community and in some respects, for 
their shared activities. They are the means by which the community 
describes and generalizes its world. Even further, they are the 
prerequisite to such description and generalization. 
Yet, according to Kuhn, kind terms do not correspond to an 
objective, mind-independent world. They can – and sometimes do 
– change. When they do, the world that they describe and 
generalize changes as well. As kind terms, however, their change 
must be of a special sort. The change cannot simply be linguistic 
but must be interrelated with a change in knowledge of the world, 
that is, a change in its kinds. In response to Davidson, Kuhn 
insisted that it may not be appropriate to expand the vocabulary of 
kind terms in order to distinguish between two kinds previously 
identified by the same kind term. Whether conceived as a mental 
module, conceptual scheme, lexicon or lexical taxonomy, kind 
terms are interrelated with other kind terms in ways that both 
support and constrain their use. Introducing a new kind term – 
particularly if it overlaps an existing kind term – may disrupt these 
relationships in ways that threaten the integrity of the overall 
conceptual scheme. Understanding changes in kind terms thus 
requires understanding the relationships that they share with other 
kind terms. It requires understanding the conceptual or lexical-
taxonomic structure within which they are placed and the sets of 
beliefs that are supplied by and bound within that structure. 
5. Incommensurability and the Possibility of Enrichment 
In outlining Davidson’s position, Kuhn noted, that Davidson 
recognized Quine’s radical translator as a language learner and 
agreed that “what he has learned cannot in its entirety be translated 
into the language he brought from home” (Ibid.). In these respects, 
then, Davidson and Kuhn would agree. Their difference lay, Kuhn 
proposed, in how this untranslatability may be resolved:  
Shabin Varghese                      Kuhn’s Theory of Incommensurability 
55 
 
. . . Davidson supposes, as I do not, that having come to 
understand how the presently understandable terms 
function in the newly acquired language, the language 
learner can enrich his native language by adding the 
missing words to it. Enrichment would then have 
eliminated incommensurability. (Kuhn, 1999, p. 35)  
Davidson’s position thus would seem to undercut 
incommensurability and the associated changes of language, 
meaning, and lexical or conceptual structure that it implies. It thus 
presents an important challenge to Kuhn’s views.  
In considering the implications of Davidson’s challenge, Kuhn 
articulated a question that had been central to his project for quite 
some time:  
. . . if Davidsonian enrichment were possible, that 
enriched language would project two incompatible 
images of the same areas of the same world, a 
consequence that would endanger the community 
which used it. That is what I take to be the case, but to 
make the position plausible one must show how a 
language can embody knowledge of nature at all. 
(Kuhn, 1999, p. 35)      
Kuhn addressed this question by reconsidering both the processes 
involved in learning Newtonian mechanics and the cognitive status 
of the acquired terms and laws:  
There are . . . various different routes which the 
learning process may traverse, but all of them involve 
positing the validity of one or more universal 
generalizations ordinarily described as laws of nature. . 
. For present purposes the details of the route do not 
matter. What is crucial, however, is that the acquisition 
of conceptual vocabulary requires giving to some laws 
of nature a definitional role that makes their cognitive 
status like that of Kant’s synthetic a priori. As other 
laws are discovered with the aid of those initially 
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posited, they too inherit that cognitive status. Though 
none of them could exist in the absence of experience 
(whence synthetic a priori rather than a priori alone), 
their experiential and their definitional content are 
inseparably merged. It is laws that do or could enter the 
language acquisition process in that way that language 
thereafter projects back upon the world. (Kuhn, 1999,      
35-6)  
The processes involved in learning the Newtonian lexicon indicate 
that language can “embody nature” through the interrelationships 
that are established between acquired terms and laws and the 
exemplary situations that are required for their acquisition. The 
laws that are thereby established are both definitional and 
legislative. As such, Kuhn proposed they have a cognitive status 
like that of Kant’s synthetic a priori. In comparing Kuhn’s 
statements with his earlier discussion of how the Newtonian 
lexicon is acquired, it seems that the cognitive status of synthetic a 
priori should be attributed not simply to the laws but to the 
interrelated set of Newtonian terms and laws. As Kuhn pointed out 
in the detailed examination provided in “Possible Worlds,” the 
specific epistemic status of the various Newtonian laws will vary, 
depending upon whether they are learned using the conception 
(and exemplars) of “inertial mass” or “gravitational mass:” “[o]n 
the first route the second law enters stipulatively, the law of 
gravitation empirically. On the second, their epistemic status is 
reversed. In each case one, but only one, of the laws is, so to speak, 
built into the lexicon” (Kuhn, 1986/2000). Even if we attribute the 
status of synthetic a priori to both laws, it seems important to 
preserve some recognition of their relation to each other and the 
epistemic implications of the alternative paths by which they may 
be acquired.  
As a result of the cognitive status of laws of nature (and those 
terms, laws, and examples that are associated with them), a change 
in the law will necessarily be accompanied by a change in the 
corresponding set of terms and examples. Thus, the transition from 
Newtonian to Einsteinian physics entailed not only a change in 
laws of nature but also a (subtle yet consequential) change in the 
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associated terms and examples (Kuhn, 1986/2000). While the terms 
of one law may be learned and distinguished from those of 
another, an Einsteinian vocabulary cannot be “enriched” with a 
Newtonian vocabulary because the underlying terms, laws, and 
examples of each view form an interrelated set that cannot 
withstand dramatic readjustments. In such cases, Davidson’s 
proposal that enrichment eliminates incommensurability is not 
viable because enrichment is not possible within the constraints 
established by the lexical structure or conceptual scheme (i.e., the 
interrelated set of terms, laws, and examples) that characterizes 
either view.  
While these considerations suggest that we may reject Davidson’s 
position and assert the possibility of incommensurability in the 
case of natural laws, the scope of these claims must still be 
determined. We must also specify more clearly the basis on which 
two laws (or representatives of other potential cases) may be said to 
be “incommensurable.” In his “Remarks,” cited above, Kuhn 
considered kind terms that are acquired with natural laws and 
proposed that the constraints deriving from the interrelation of 
their terms and laws eliminated the possibility of enrichment in 
cases of untranslatability. In considering the basis for 
incommensurability, we might narrow this scope to encompass 
only those natural laws whose acquired terms overlap in some 
respects yet differ in others. Two laws may be untranslatable yet 
not necessarily possess overlapping terms, in which case 
enrichment would not threaten the interrelations established by 
either law.  
On the other hand, we must also consider whether kind terms 
other than natural laws may present the possibility of 
incommensurability. In “Afterwords,” Kuhn distinguished 
“nomic,” or exceptionless, generalizations (i.e., natural laws) from 
the more common, “normic” generalizations (e.g., “liquid” or 
“solid”), which admit exceptions and are learned in contrast sets. 
While the discussions above suggest that changes in nomic 
generalizations, or natural laws will result in incommensurability, 
this is not necessarily the case for changes in normic 
generalizations. Enrichment might be possible in the second case 
because normic generalizations are acquired and structurally 
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interrelated as contrasting terms that admit of exceptions. 
Situations thus may arise in which an untranslatable, “contrasting” 
kind term can be introduced into a different conceptual scheme 
without harm to the structure of other, contrasting terms. On the 
other hand, because these are kind terms that embody knowledge 
of nature, there may well be some limits to the exceptions that they 
would admit, suggesting that incommensurability remains a 
possibility. 
From these considerations, we can more clearly examine the basis 
for incommensurability. First, we must revise Kuhn’s earlier 
characterization of incommensurability as untranslatability to 
specify that it is untranslatability without the possibility of 
enrichment. Secondly, we must understand enrichment to be 
limited with respect to kind terms whose referents overlap in areas 
that do not admit of exception. We are left, then, with a much 
narrower conception of incommensurability as applicable to: 
1. Alternative sets of natural laws whose acquired terms differ 
yet overlap with respect to some portion of the law; and  
2. Alternative sets of contrasting kind terms whose terms 
differ, yet overlap in ways that do not admit of (proposed) 
exceptions. 
In these cases, a change in the generalization or in the acquired 
kind terms will result in incommensurability. Enrichment will not 
be possible within the context of either generalization, given the 
distinctive and overlapping interrelations between each of the 
generalizations and their acquired terms. 
Although this conception of incommensurability is narrower than 
the one(s) that Kuhn articulated previously, it is also more precise. 
As such, it provides a clear indication of the types of change that 
result in incommensurability, namely, changes in the underlying 
structures of the natural laws and kind terms that are used in 
descriptions and generalizations about the world. It indicates a 
particular type of change in kind terms that is accompanied by a 
change in the associated referents. As thus conceived, 
incommensurability indicates a structural change in our knowledge 
of nature that is not only linguistic but also substantive. 




The issues discussed in this article, regarding the underlying 
philosophical commitments of linguistics, the nature of linguistic 
explanation, and the social and institutional history of language, 
continue to be discussed, and give rise to lively debate and 
disagreement. The Kuhnian or otherwise nature of linguistics, is a 
source of fascination for both linguists and philosophers. A recent 
publication, Chomskyan Revolutions edited by Douglas Kibbee, 
brings together a large number of the more recent contributions, 
and the debate shows little sign of receding. The consequences of 
this article are, I hope, for those whose work involves familiarity or 
contact with both paradigms and incommensurability to see them 
in a new light. What sometimes looks like entrenched 
disagreement, or plain bloody-mindedness, might in fact be 
incommensurable concepts obscured by identical vocabulary. 
End Notes 
(#) - The problem of incommensurability, presented both by Kuhn and by 
Paul Feyerabend in slightly different forms, suggested that the meaning of 
theoretical terms differed in various applications or iterations of scientific 
theories, thereby rendering the evaluation or comparison of these 
“incommensurable” theories problematic. Yet the conclusions drawn by 
Kuhn and Feyerabend ‘that evaluation or comparison of 
incommensurable generalizations must be conducted on the basis of 
something other than logical or linguistic analysis seemed to challenge the 
very foundations of established views of rationality. For scholars who 
were loath to give up this established position, incommensurability 
needed to be explained and the problem of meaning change that it 
presented needed to be addressed. 
($) - By ‘ontologically committed’ I mean that each theory has its own 
subject-matter and that different theories depict different world-pictures. 
A theory encompasses its own unique language to express that 
commitment. 
(^) - Kuhn’s application of the causal theory of reference through 
multiple acts of dubbing is similar to this consideration of the role 
of exemplars in establishing the language-nature link and the 
incommensurability that results from changes in the language-
nature link 
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